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Abstract
A longstanding criticism of Lenin is that his epistemological contributions to the 
theory of scientific socialism prompted the decline of Marxism in dogmatism and 
despotism in the twentieth century. According to this narrative, Lenin claimed to 
possess the objective truth, and he therefore refused to tolerate alternative perspec-
tives. This article subjects these claims to a textual analysis, and it argues that they 
are erroneous. Lenin defends a fallibilist account of science that affirms the uncer-
tainty of knowledge in the natural, philosophical and social sciences. This fallibi-
lism pervades the text that supposedly showcases his intolerance, Materialism and 
Empirio-Criticism. Lenin’s scientific socialism opposes rigid conceptions of social-
ism, and it encourages an atmosphere of democratic debate. Whilst Lenin’s writ-
ings have their flaws, they are not the founding documents of Marxist dogmatism 
that they are often portrayed as being. Lenin is not the narrow-minded vulgariser of 
Marxism that he is routinely taken to be.
Keywords Lenin · Scientific socialism · Marxism · Dogmatism · Epistemology · 
Philosophy of science
Do not debase our revolutionary science to the level of mere book dogma, do not 
vulgarise it.
V. I. Lenin, “New Tasks and New Forces” (1977, vol. 8, 218).
Introduction
In their most popular works Marx and Engels argued that the workers could 
emancipate themselves from the yoke of capital only if their revolutionary theory 
was scientific. In contrast to the utopian socialists, who focused on devising fan-
tastical blueprints of the future society, the founders of Marxism emphasised the 
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importance of conducting a scientific analysis of society and its laws of develop-
ment. In their view, science, and not metaphysical speculation, provided the most 
effective path to human freedom.
Today, however, it is widely thought that the theory of scientific socialism 
failed to emancipate society, and that it instead prompted the decline of Marx-
ism into dogmatism and dictatorship. According to this narrative, the belief that 
Marxism was a science gave its followers the conviction that they had discovered 
the objective truth, and that they could ‘guarantee methodological certainty and 
doctrinal orthodoxy’ (Thomas 1976, 2). Having obtained the correct solutions to 
the major political problems, Marxists refused to tolerate alternative perspectives. 
They could not improve their scientific truths by subjecting them to the popular 
will or the ballot box, and they therefore disregarded democratic institutions: ‘the 
Marxist scientists…set themselves up as arbiters of ‘objective truth’- not only 
about how we do actually behave but also about how we ought to behave’ (Femia 
1993, 126).
Although the view that Marxism degenerated into intolerance and dogmatism is 
relatively uncontroversial, scholars disagree over whose ideas are responsible. One 
line of thought pins the blame on Marx himself. The prominent philosopher of sci-
ence Popper (1962, 269) advanced one of the earliest and most detailed expositions 
of this view in his influential book, The Open Society and its Enemies. According 
to him, the feature of Marx’s thought that encourages dogmatism is his belief in 
a precise and empirically based science of human organisation and development, 
modelled on Newtonian physics. In the same way that the physicist searches for 
causal natural laws, Marx claimed to uncover the inexorable economic ‘laws’ that 
govern history and society with ‘iron necessity’, unaffected by individual intentions 
or motives: ‘Herein lies the source of the utter certitude (moral and political)’ that 
actuates communists’ (Femia 1993, 124–125).
After the discovery of Marx’s earlier ‘humanistic’ writings, however, sympathetic 
interpreters began to increasingly question his responsibility for dogmatism. A new 
reading suggested that Marx actually provided the intellectual foundations for a 
more open, sophisticated and democratic Marxism.
A second narrative traces the roots of Marxist dogmatism back to Engels’ rejec-
tion of utopian socialism and his popularisation of the term ‘scientific socialism’. In 
his Anti-Duhring and Dialectics of Nature, Engels supposedly gave historical mate-
rialism an infallible basis by arguing that the laws of history are derived from the 
laws of nature (Ball 1984). The defenders of this view attempt to distance Marx 
from these texts by arguing that he either defends a more sophisticated version of 
scientific socialism, or that he rejects the concept entirely (Thomas 1976, 2).
A third line of thought challenges the association of Engels with dogmatism by 
arguing that he actually defends a fallibilist, anti-dogmatic conception of science 
(Sheehan 1993, 46–6). It also points out that his discussion of the utopians in Anti-
Duhring is primarily ‘a work of praise’ of their ideas, rather than a straightforward 
rejection. Whilst the supporters of this interpretation criticise Engels’ ‘indefensible’ 
attempt to create a cosmological ‘super-science’, in addition to his infrequent sci-
entism, they convincingly argue that his theory of scientific socialism endorses an 
atmosphere of open discussion (O’Neill 1996, 49–50, 54).
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Currently, one of the most popular and least contested narratives is that Lenin’s 
uniquely epistemological contributions to the doctrine of scientific socialism are 
responsible for Marxist dogmatism (Ryan 2012, 18; Read 2005, 73; Harding 
1996, 241; Boselager 1975, 32–33; Liebman 1975, 443; Ballestrem 1969, 307; 
Jordan 1967, 357–361; Wolfe 1965, 357–358; Meyer 1957, 298; Bochenski 1963, 
1, 28, 48; Plamenatz 1954, 249). As the proponents of this narrative correctly 
point out, after the October Socialist Revolution, it was Lenin’s interpretation 
of scientific socialism, rather than that of Marx and Engels, which became the 
supreme source of authority in the communist world and Third International. It 
was therefore Lenin, and not the founders, who had the largest impact upon the 
growth of ‘methodological certainty’ and ‘doctrinal orthodoxy’ in Marxism.
In this story of Lenin’s scientific socialism as the ‘genetic link’ between Marx-
ism and dictatorship, the text most often cited as evidence is Materialism and 
Empirio-Criticism (Bakhurst 2018: 115–117). It is in this work that Lenin devel-
ops his ‘highly doctrinaire, not to say religious-dogmatic…approach to Marx-
ist philosophy’ (Tucker 1975, 639). It is here that he subjects his philosophical 
opponents to ‘unbridled abuse’, ‘cheap mockery and invective’. It is here that the 
philosophical ideas of Engels ‘are vulgarised and turned into cut-and-dried cat-
echetical forms’ (Kolakowski 1978, 721–727). Most crucially, it is in this text 
that Lenin introduces his notorious ‘copy’ theory of perception, which holds that 
human perceptions correctly and accurately ‘reflect’ the objective external world. 
Because Lenin thinks that people have an unmediated view of reality, he suppos-
edly concludes that they can obtain certain knowledge about this reality (Service 
1985, 181–182). In this way, Lenin provides the philosophical foundations for a 
dogmatic politics.
When Lenin published Materialism and Empirio-Criticism in 1909 it initially 
had little impact upon the development of Marxism. However, Hunt (1950, 212) 
argues that after the Soviet Union rose to prominence this text became ‘the standard 
of intellectual orthodoxy, any departure from which could be represented as being 
as much an act of treachery to the revolutionary movement as were divergences on 
questions of party strategy and tactics’.
Liberals and conservatives are not the only proponents of this narrative, for 
the currents of Left-Bolshevism, Russian Menshevism, Left Communism, West-
ern Marxism, and the Frankfurt school, provided the earliest criticisms of Lenin’s 
philosophical intolerance (Bogdanov 1910, 178–183; Yushkevich 1910, 141; Pan-
nekoek 1975; Korsch 1975, 117; 1970, 130; Horkheimer 1987, 184; Adorno 2008, 
37). Some Marxist–Leninists advanced similar positions later on in their intellec-
tual careers, usually after becoming somewhat disillusioned with the Soviet Union’s 
‘repressive’ practices (e.g. Cornforth 1980, 65–73).
The prevailing view then, is that whilst Lenin attempted to replicate the same 
lines of thought as his intellectually suppler predecessors, he could never achieve 
this successfully. His foray into the philosophy of science instead produced a dog-
matic and crude distortion of the doctrine that Marx and Engels developed in a more 
subtle and sophisticated form. Lenin’s vulgar, anti-democratic Marxism continues to 
highlight the intellectual, democratic virtues of Marx and Engels. His contributions 
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to scientific socialism serve as a dangerous reminder of what Marxism can become 
in the mind of a less considerate thinker.1
By undertaking a more systematic, detailed, and complete analysis of Lenin’s 
epistemological contributions to Marxism, this article rejects the narrative that his 
theory of scientific socialism is committed to a dogmatic, non-democratic politics. 
This narrative is based upon the claim that Lenin associates science with the attain-
ment of certain, unquestionable knowledge. Not only does Lenin reject this asso-
ciation throughout his writings, such as in his Philosophical Notebooks. He explic-
itly denies that science provides certain knowledge in the very text that supposedly 
showcases his theoretical orthodoxy and intolerance. In Materialism and Empirio-
Criticism Lenin defends a fallibilist account of science.2 Whilst he affirms the pos-
sibility of obtaining objective (i.e. true) knowledge of the world, he argues that this 
knowledge always remains uncertain, incomplete, and infinitely revisable.3 His 
conception of science therefore encourages a spirit of rational, democratic debate 
amongst political participants.
Whilst Lenin’s texts on the philosophy of science may have their flaws, they are 
not the founding documents of Marxist dogmatism that they are often portrayed as 
being. Lenin is not the narrow-minded vulgariser of classical Marxism that he is 
routinely taken to be.
This article proceeds in three sections. The first section highlights the virtues 
of Lenin’s scientific fallibilism by arguing that it is more convincing than Popper’s 
influential account. Section two argues that Lenin extends this fallibilism to the phil-
osophical and social sciences. He highlights unique obstacles to truth in politics and 
history, with the purpose of opposing dogmatism in socialist debate. The conclusion 
argues that the intellectual virtues of Lenin’s scientific socialism can combat the rise 
of dogmatism in the present era of ‘post-truth politics’.
2 Lenin himself does not use the term ‘fallibilism’ or its cognate terms in his writings. The use of this 
term throughout this article reflects the present author’s Popperian interpretative apparatus.
3 Bykova (2018, 246) and Bakhurst (2018, 110) defend a similar reading in their recent studies on Mate-
rialism and Empirio-Criticism. This article supports and expands upon their positions.
1 Not everyone subscribes to the standard caricature. Anderson and Danayevskaya argue that Lenin 
developed a more flexible, dialectical understanding of the world and human knowledge in his 1914/15 
Philosophical Notebooks (Anderson 1995, 71–72; Dunayevskaya 1973, Ch. 3). This narrative is unsat-
isfactory in two respects, however. Firstly, because Anderson and Dunayevsaya focus primarily upon 
Lenin’s ontology, they treat his epistemology as a side issue of secondary importance. Secondly, there 
is little textual evidence to show that Lenin altered his philosophical views after ‘rediscovering Hegel’ 
in 1914 (Coombs 2016, 2; Michael-Matsas 2007, 112). The notion of an epistemological break has no 
basis, for Lenin chose to publish a second edition of Materialism and Empirio-Criticism in 1920, several 
years after he wrote his Philosophical Notebooks. In the preface Lenin (1977, vol. 14, 21) emphasises 
the importance of the text by stating that ‘the present edition does not differ from the previous one. I 
hope that…it will prove useful as an aid to an acquaintance with the philosophy of Marxism, dialectical 
materialism’. Lenin therefore never rejected the ‘vulgar materialism’ of Materialism and Empirio-Criti-
cism. On the contrary, he always believed that this work provided the definitive account of his philoso-
phy. Mayer (1999) and Shandro (2014, 149–164) argue that Lenin views Marxism as a guide to practice, 
rather than a dogma. By focusing upon Lenin’s political writings, however, they ignore the insights con-
tained in his philosophical works.
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Lenin, Popper, and fallibilism
Throughout his 1914/15 Philosophical Notebooks Lenin repeatedly affirms ‘the 
finite, transitory, relative, conditional character of human cognition’ (1977, vol. 
38, 207). During the course of analysing Hegel’s ideas, he concludes that the 
human mind can only ever provide an approximate reflection of nature, rather 
than a perfect copy of it. In his ‘Conspectus of Hegel’s Science of the Logic’, for 
instance, Lenin states that ‘Knowledge is the reflection of nature by man. But this 
is not a simple, not an immediate, not a complete reflection’. On the contrary, 
‘Man cannot comprehend = reflect = mirror nature as a whole, in its complete-
ness, its “immediate totality,” he can only eternally come closer to this, creating 
abstractions, concepts, laws, a scientific picture of the world’ (1977, vol. 38, 182; 
see also 195). Later on, in his ‘Conspectus of Hegel’s Lectures on the History 
of Philosophy’, Lenin argues that the universe is constantly developing, and this 
leads him to argue that ‘if everything develops, does not that apply also to the 
most general concepts and categories of thought?’ (1977, vol. 38, 254). Finally, 
in his celebrated essay ‘On the Question of Dialectics’, Lenin states that dialecti-
cal philosophy provides ‘living, many-sided knowledge (with the number of sides 
eternally increasing), with an infinite number of shades of every approach and 
approximation to reality (with a philosophical system growing into a whole out 
of each shade)’ (1977, 38, 360). These passages reject the possibility of obtaining 
certain knowledge.
One of the more sophisticated interpreters of Lenin, Neil Harding, provides 
two reasons as to why scholars should dismiss the relevance of Lenin’s Philo-
sophical Notebooks. Firstly, the text itself is little more than a set of scattered 
pronouncements and telegraphic one-liners. Lenin’s remarks are discontinuous, 
they are hard to ‘disentangle’ from those of Hegel, and that they take the form of 
either ‘summaries or cryptic comments at a high level of abstraction’. Secondly, 
Lenin’s 1914 reflections were ‘private ruminations’, not intended for publica-
tion. They were not discovered and made public until 1928–1929 (Harding 1996, 
234). Lenin supposedly chose not to publish his notebooks because they were 
‘too explosive…too critical of his own “vulgar-materialist” standpoint of 5 years 
previously’. The fallibilist ideas contained in this work introduced a relativist ele-
ment into Marxism that could undermine its claim to possess certain knowledge 
(Harding 1996, 237).
Harding’s arguments for dismissing Lenin’s Philosophical Notebooks are 
unconvincing. Firstly, the disjointed structure of the text provides no justification 
to reject it. Scholars regularly analyse documents with jumbled structures, and 
they often view them to be as important as published material. Secondly, the fact 
that Lenin never published his notebooks does not prove that he rejected the ideas 
contained within them, nor does it make them irrelevant. Several works by polit-
ical thinkers were unpublished during their time, yet scholars still value them. 
Commentators on Lenin should treat his ‘private ruminations’ no differently. The 
political reasons that Harding outlines for Lenin suppressing the text are purely 
speculative, and impossible to prove via a textual analysis. He is therefore wrong 
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to conclude that the ideas contained within Lenin’s Philosophical Notebooks can 
‘hardly count as elements of Leninism as ideology’ (Harding 1996, 234). In any 
case, Lenin’s remarks on the fallibilism of scientific knowledge are not limited to 
his Philosophical Notebooks. He defends the same ideas in the text that is viewed 
as the classical document of his dogmatism.
Materialism and Empirio-Criticism (1977, vol. 14, 11) is, for the most part, an 
uncompromising and relentless assault upon ‘the enemies of dialectical and histori-
cal materialism’. As such, the text is not a shining example of western intellectual 
values. Lenin constantly insults his philosophical opponents in the most vulgar 
fashion throughout, and he also misrepresents their views in order to lump them all 
together under the ‘idealist’ camp.4 Whilst the text therefore deserves some of its 
notoriety, it does not, however, affirm the possibility of obtaining certain knowledge.
In chapters two and three Lenin criticises the neo-Kantian view that it is impos-
sible to obtain knowledge of a mind-independent world, and that the content of sub-
jective human experience defines the limits of knowledge. He argues that this view 
can lead to irrationalism and dogmatism, for if people experience the world differ-
ently, and if truth is an ‘organising form of experience’, then there is no objective 
reality/standard to verify beliefs against, and anyone can assert that their (experi-
enced based) belief is true. This subjectivism can, for instance, lead to the ‘the toler-
ance—the philistine, cowardly tolerance—of the dogmas regarding sprites, hobgob-
lins, Catholic saints, and the like’ (CW 14: 128).
Lenin defends the materialist view that the external world exists independently of 
the human mind, and that the latter can approximately represent the world as it is. 
In contrast to Kant, he argues that ‘things in themselves’ are knowable, and as such, 
beliefs about the world can be objectively true, in the sense that they approximately 
reflect reality.
At the same time, however, Lenin develops his view that ‘in the theory of knowl-
edge, as in every other sphere of science, we must think dialectically’. That is, ‘we 
must not regard our knowledge as ready-made and unalterable’. Lenin views the 
growth of knowledge to be an endless process, in which people gradually gain a 
more accurate picture of the world. The dialectical method describes how ‘knowl-
edge emerges from ignorance, how incomplete, inexact knowledge becomes more 
complete and more exact’ (1977, vol. 14, 103).
Dialectics, Lenin (1977, vol. 14, 136) argues, ‘recognises the relativity of all our 
knowledge, not in the sense of denying objective truth, but in the sense that the lim-
its of approximation of our knowledge to objective, absolute truth are historically 
conditional’. That is, ‘each step in the development of science adds new grains to 
the sum of absolute truth, but the limits of the truth of each scientific proposition 
are relative, now expanding, now shrinking with the growth of knowledge’ (1977, 
vol. 14, 135). Lenin’s epistemology acknowledges the generally progressive, objec-
tive character of scientific knowledge, whilst keeping it open to future revisions 
4 Some commentators take the philosophical content of Lenin’s work seriously (and recognize his falli-
bilism) while complaining that its style, rather than its substance, encouraged of the rise of dogmatism in 
Soviet philosophy (e.g. Wolfe 2001, 517; Bakhurst 1991, ch. 4; 2018, 115–118).
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and modification: ‘by following the path of Marxian theory we shall draw closer 
and closer to objective truth (without ever exhausting it)’ (1977, vol. 1, 143). The 
purpose of this dialectical conception of relative and absolute truth is to ‘prevent 
science from becoming a dogma in the bad sense of the term, from becoming 
something dead, frozen, ossified’ (1977, vol. 14, 136). It highlights the precarious, 
relative and limited nature of human knowledge, which reflects external reality only 
in the infinite process of approximation.
In the course of developing his theory of knowledge Lenin (1977, vol. 14, 135) 
also refers to the philosopher Joseph Dietzgen as a principal source of authority. 
This is significant, for scholars recognise Dietzgen’s work specifically for his fal-
libilist attitude to science (O’Neill 1996, 63). Lenin highlights and defends this fea-
ture of Dietzgen’s thought not only in Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, but also 
in a later article written to commemorate the 25th anniversary of his death. During 
a time when materialists were displaying dogmatic tendencies, Dietzgen emphasised 
‘the need to…understand that all human knowledge is relative’ (1977, vol. 19, 80). 
By repeatedly describing Dietzgen as a key founder of scientific socialism, with 
almost the same level of prestige as Marx and Engels, Lenin makes it clear that fal-
libilism is a cornerstone of his philosophy.
In summary, Lenin’s epistemology has two sides. On the one hand, he emphasises 
the dialectical character of knowledge, which is approximate, shifting and changing. 
On the other hand, he highlights the materialist side, which insists that knowledge is 
in fact objective. Critical commentators argue that these two sides are incompatible, 
and this underpins their reading of Lenin as a philosophical and political dogmatist. 
The preceding analysis shows that this is not the case. Lenin’s point is that the rec-
ognition of science as a historical process of uneven advance towards more adequate 
levels of knowledge depends upon a reality that exists objectively and independently 
of cognition. That is, one can understand the continuous development of scientific 
knowledge only by recognising the necessary connection between these two sides. 
Lenin’s position is not only consistent, but compelling as well. The commitment to 
fallibilism does require the recognition of an objective reality that the human mind 
can access and approximately represent in the form of objective knowledge.
According to Zizek (1997), the epistemology of Materialism and Empirio-Crit-
icism advocates the same ‘basic position’ as Karl Popper, whose peculiar version 
of fallibilism once dominated discussions in the philosophy of science. This view 
is incorrect.5 Whilst Lenin’s fallibilism is certainly similar to Popper’s influential 
account, they each develop their ideas from different philosophical starting points.6 
Lenin’s account is also more convincing than Popper’s. A comparison of their doc-
trines can show why this is the case.
5 Zizek’s claim is unconvincing not only because he provides no textual evidence, but because he also 
contradicts himself in another article, ‘A plea for Leninist intolerance’. Here he highlights the dogmatism 
of Leninism by arguing that ‘its universal truth can only be articulated from a thoroughly partisan posi-
tion; truth is by definition one-sided.’ As Zizek (2002, 550) concludes, ‘this, of course, goes against the 
predominant doxa of compromise, of finding a middle path among the multitude of conflicting interests’.
6 Contra Zizek (1997), Lenin’s position does not belong ‘in the Anglo-Saxon tradition of analytical phi-
losophy’.
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A popular myth in the philosophy of science is that prior to Popper’s contri-
butions, scientific inductivism and dogmatism reigned supreme. The inductiv-
ist account of science holds that scientific knowledge begins with an observation, 
which is then followed by the proposal of a modest law that generalises the observed 
pattern. This means that a single observation can establish the existence of universal 
laws in nature. Inductivism led to dogmatism, since it could seemingly prove scien-
tific theories to be true.
Popper tackled the problem of induction by arguing that an observation of nature 
cannot establish the existence of a universal law, for if one took the same observa-
tion at a different time or place, the results could be different. For example, an obser-
vation of the sun rising one morning does not prove the universal statement that it 
will rise every morning. This is because there may be no uniformity in nature. The 
laws of the natural world may change across time and space (Popper 1972, 7).
Popper claimed to have solved the problem of induction by arguing that science 
requires not induction, but deduction, according to which a single observation can 
falsify a universal statement. The observation of a black swan, for example, would 
disprove the universal statement that all swans are white. Popper’s fallibilism argues 
that science proceeds via the formation of a hypothesis, which is then subjected to 
various tests. If the test falsifies the hypothesis, then it must be replaced by a new 
hypothesis, which will itself be tested. According to this account, scientific knowl-
edge develops not through successful predictions, but through failed predictions 
(Popper 1972, 27).
Needless to say, philosophers of science have mostly rejected Popper’s sceptical 
account of the problem of induction. One of the main objections is that his theory 
fails to describe the historical development of real world science. Several valid sci-
entific theories encountered observational claims that were inconsistent with them, 
and if scientists had followed Popper’s deductivist methodology, they would have 
rejected these theories in their infancy. Nevertheless, scientists did not reject these 
theories, and this benefitted science in the long run. Few would now deny that 
science, understood as a critical and rational mode of enquiry, requires and does 
assume a degree of uniformity in nature (Chalmers 1982, 66). It cannot and does not 
progress upon the basis of Popper’s philosophical scepticism.
The philosophical basis of Lenin’s (1977, vol. 19, 24) fallibilism is not scepti-
cism, but dialectical materialism, which he defines as ‘the doctrine of the relativity 
of the human knowledge that provides us with a reflection of eternally developing 
matter’. Lenin’s philosophy of science is dispersed throughout his writings, and as 
such, it is impossible to discern in a straightforward manner. It is still worth recon-
structing the fundamentals of his doctrine, however, for it sheds light on the fallible 
nature of the sciences.
Like Popper, Lenin (1977, vol. 14, 305) is critical of the inductivist approach to 
science, for he points out that the development of scientific knowledge is character-
ised by the ‘abrupt break-down of old established concepts’. Theories in biology, 
chemistry and physics are constantly falsified, ‘for with each step in the develop-
ment of science new aspects are discovered’ (1977, vol. 14, 129). Whilst, therefore, 
the world and its laws can be known to man, they can ‘never be known to him with 
finality’ (1977, vol. 14, 189).
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Lenin’s critique of scientific inductivism is not, however, based upon Popper’s 
scepticism concerning the uniformity of nature. He criticises ‘fashionable bourgeois 
scepticism’ for its ‘tendency to despise generalisations’ and ‘hide from the “laws” 
of historical development’. Lenin (1977, vol. 14, 155) believes that there is a degree 
of uniformity in nature, and that some truths are therefore beyond reasonable doubt. 
He points out that some natural laws are ‘accepted by all despite the host of seem-
ing contraventions and deviations shown in the medley of individual cases, and the 
search for corrections and supplements to them’ (1977, vol. 20, 201).
What Lenin grants to Popper’s critique of induction is that the observation of reg-
ularities is insufficient in proving the existence of causal relationships: ‘the simplest 
truth obtained in the simplest inductive way is always incomplete, for experience 
is always unfinished. Ergo: the connection of induction with…the relativity of all 
knowledge’ (1977, vol. 38, 180). In his view, one can identify causal relations and 
thereby acquire scientific knowledge only through ‘practice, experiment and indus-
try’ (1977, vol. 14, 170).
Critical realism has recently reiterated Lenin’s critique of induction (Bhaskar 
1989). Science does not develop by observing regularities in nature. The natural 
world is an open system, which means that the events that take place within it do 
not always occur regularly, and nor are they always observable. Almost every event 
in the natural world results from a combination of causal mechanisms, and they are 
characterised by hardly any regularities (1977, vol. 21, 54). Only the controlled con-
ditions created by experiments can attempt to investigate and isolate the particular 
causal relationships that operate in nature. They do this by constructing closed sys-
tems that try to remove or minimise the influence of unwanted external factors. The 
problem of establishing a completely closed system through experimentation pro-
vides the foundation of Lenin’s fallibilism.
Lenin proceeds from the assumption that all objects in the universe are intercon-
nected, and that ‘if we are to have a true knowledge of an object we must look at and 
examine all its facets, its connections and “mediacies”’. He introduces his fallibi-
lism by arguing that a complete examination of all these connections ‘is something 
we cannot ever hope to achieve completely’. Lenin still emphasises the importance 
of striving to gain the most accurate and detailed picture, however, for ‘the rule of 
comprehensiveness is a safeguard against mistakes and rigidity’ (1977, vol. 32, 94).
One reason as to why the interconnectedness of nature prohibits the discovery 
of certain knowledge, in Lenin’s view, is that it is impossible to ensure experimen-
tal closure. He illustrates this point by giving the example of Boyle’s law, which 
states that the pressure and volume of a gas have an inverse relationship. If the vol-
ume of gas increases, then its pressure decreases, and vice versa. However, this law 
only holds true under controlled conditions, wherein the temperature is held at a 
constant. As such, ‘the “grain of truth” contained in this law is only absolute truth 
within certain limits. The law, it appears, is a truth “only approximately”’ (1977, 
vol. 14, 134–135). According to Lenin, the causes and effects identified in experi-
ments and small-scale observations are different in larger environments, where the 
interconnections are innumerable and even harder to establish, and this means that 
‘the all-sidedness and all-embracing character of the interconnection of the world…
is only one-sidedly, fragmentarily and incompletely expressed by causality’ (1977, 
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vol. 38, 159). Every law ‘always somewhat simplifies the objective connection of 
the phenomena of nature, reflecting it only approximately, artificially isolating one 
or another aspect of a single world process’ (1977, vol. 14, 156). In other words, 
‘law, every law, is narrow, incomplete, [and] approximate’ (1977, vol. 38, 151).
The problems involved in obtaining non-revisable knowledge through experimen-
tation are not, for Lenin, of a purely practical nature. He argues that it is impossible 
in principle. Scientists cannot control the conditions that can influence the result of 
an experiment because there are an infinite number of properties in nature, which 
can never be exhausted by scientific knowledge. Firstly, he believes that all objects 
contain an infinite number of qualities. A tumbler, for example, ‘is assuredly both 
a glass cylinder and a drinking vessel. But there are more than these two proper-
ties, qualities or facets to it; there are an infinite number of them’ (1977, vol. 32, 
93). Secondly, he argues that nature also possesses a quantitative infinity. All objects 
can be divided an infinite number of times, hence his belief that ‘the atom can be 
explained as resembling an infinitely small solar system’, and that ‘nature is infinite, 
just as its smallest particle (including the electron) is infinite’. This means that the 
‘“essence” of things, or “substance,” is also  relative; it expresses only the degree 
of profundity of man’s knowledge of objects’ (1977, vol. 14, 260, 262). Because 
one can always obtain a deeper level of understanding of objects, the infinite diver-
sity of properties in nature prohibits the attainment of infallible knowledge of the 
natural world: ‘Human thought goes endlessly deeper from appearance to essence, 
from essence of the first order, as it were, to essence of the second order, and so on 
without end’ (1977, vol. 38, 251–252). Thus, whilst ‘yesterday the profundity of this 
knowledge did not go beyond the atom, and today does not go beyond the electron 
and ether’, dialectical materialism ‘insists on the temporary, relative, approximate 
character of all these milestones in the knowledge of nature gained by the progress-
ing science of man’ (1977, vol. 14, 262).
As Lenin believes that it is impossible to obtain experimental closure, he con-
cludes that it is ‘precisely (and only)’ by repeating experiments ‘a thousand million 
times’ that one can approach absolute knowledge (1977, vol. 38, 216). This means 
that ‘the criterion of practice’, i.e. scientific empirical study and investigation, ‘can 
never, in the nature of things, either confirm or refute any human idea completely. 
This criterion too is sufficiently “indefinite” not to allow human knowledge to 
become “absolute”’ (1977, vol. 14, 142–143).
Lenin’s critique of induction highlights the fallacy of using a limited number of 
observations to prove a universally valid claim, when the quantifier ranges across an 
infinitely large domain. Whilst Popper views the infinity of the realm of natural pro-
cesses, objects and events only in terms of their spatial and temporal location, Lenin 
understands it in terms of their infinite number of properties.
Lenin’s fallibilist account of science has its flaws. For example, his claim that it is 
necessary to repeat experiments ‘a thousand million times’ in order to achieve cer-
tain knowledge is confused. A consistent fallibilist would argue that theories always 
remain uncertain, no matter how many times people test them. Nevertheless, Lenin’s 
view that the impossibility of obtaining experimental closure explains the fallible 
character of scientific knowledge is more convincing than Popper’s account. The 
problem of induction in science is not Popper’s scepticism regarding the uniformity 
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of nature, but the interconnectedness and variety of the natural world that Lenin 
identifies. Lenin also provides a more convincing explanation than Popper as to why 
scientists undertake and repeat experiments. Efforts to limit the variety of properties 
in nature constitute the rational for controlling and repeating experiments. Scientists 
attempt to achieve experimental control not in order to check the effects of place 
and time, but in order to limit the amount of external variables that can affect the 
results. Scientists repeat experiments not in order to obtain more cases for induc-
tive inference, but to ensure that previous experiments were adequately controlled. 
Scientists conduct new experiments in order to investigate scientific hypotheses in 
untested conditions, rather than in different places and times. Although it will never 
be known for certain, this may explain why Popper (cited in Colletti 1996, 51), in 
a private letter from 1970, wrote that ‘Lenin’s book on Empirio-Criticism is, in my 
opinion, truly excellent’.
Lenin’s fallibilist conception of philosophy and social science
Critical perspectives tend to disregard Lenin’s views on science by arguing that 
they bear no relation to his partisan ‘philosophy of certainty’, which is immune to 
criticism or revision (Harding 1996, 241). Even a more sympathetic commentator, 
David-Hillel Ruben (1977, 189), argues that ‘for Lenin, philosophical materialism 
retains a certain imperviousness to the results of the special sciences’. This narra-
tive is unconvincing for three reasons. First of all, Lenin argues that the ontology 
of dialectical materialism is so general that even bourgeois scientists subscribe to 
it. Modern physics is ‘giving birth to dialectical materialism’, ‘not consciously, but 
instinctively, not clearly perceiving its “final goal”, but drawing closer to it grop-
ingly, unsteadily, and sometimes even with its back turned to it’ (1977, vol. 14, 313). 
Lenin’s main point, which he further develops in his article On the Significance of 
Militant Materialism, is that several natural scientists are dialectical materialists 
without even knowing it (1977, vol. 33, 227–236). This shows that Leninist philoso-
phy can encompass a variety of perspectives. It is not committed to a specific politi-
cal platform, let alone a dogmatic politics.
Secondly, several passages in Materialism and Empirio-Criticism defend a fal-
libilist conception of philosophical knowledge. In chapter four for instance, Lenin 
argues that ‘Marx, Engels and J. Dietzgen did not worry about the elementary truths 
of materialism, which had been cried by the hucksters in dozens of books’. During 
the historical period in which the founders of scientific socialism developed their 
philosophical ideas, they ‘devoted all their attention to ensuring that these elemen-
tary truths should not be vulgarised, should not be over-simplified, should not lead 
to stagnation of thought’. They were ‘more concerned to dissociate themselves from 
the vulgarisation of the elementary truths of materialism than to defend these truths 
themselves’ (1977, vol. 14, 243).
Thirdly, Lenin (1977, vol. 14, 21) himself rejects the idea that science and phi-
losophy are unrelated, for in the preface to the second edition of Materialism and 
Empirio-Criticism he states that the purpose of his book is to elucidate ‘the phil-
osophical conclusions from the recent discoveries in natural science’. Like Marx, 
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Engels and Dietzgen before him, Lenin believes that a genuine philosophy should 
base its propositions not upon metaphysical speculation, but upon the latest find-
ings in the natural sciences. Since Lenin (1977, vol. 14, 185) recognises that ‘the 
teachings of science on the structure of matter, on the chemical composition of food, 
on the atom and the electron, may and constantly do become obsolete’, he argues 
that Marxists should revise the propositions of dialectical materialism in accordance 
with these new discoveries: ‘Engels says explicitly “with each epoch making dis-
covery even in the sphere of natural science [“not to speak of the history of man-
kind”], materialism has to change its form”’. Accordingly, ‘a revision of the “form” 
of Engels’ materialism, a revision of his natural-philosophical propositions is not 
only not “revisionism,” in the accepted meaning of the term, but, on the contrary, is 
demanded by Marxism’ (1977, vol. 14, 251). Lenin sought to accomplish this task 
for his own time in chapter five of Materialism and Empirio-Criticism.
By arguing that even the natural sciences are fallible, and by then stressing the 
dependency of dialectical materialism upon findings in the natural sciences, Lenin 
undermines the strategy of proclaiming absolute truths in the sphere of philosophy 
by appealing to such truths in the natural sciences. His emphasis upon the insepa-
rability of natural science and philosophy therefore reinforces his opposition to 
dogmatism.
Lenin also highlights the unique obstacles to certain knowledge in the social 
sciences that make them more fallible than the natural sciences. His purpose is 
to emphasise the inevitability of error in socio-political analysis, and to therefore 
oppose dogmatic tendencies in the Marxist movement.
Lenin’s philosophy of natural science assumes that the natural world is filled with 
mostly non-sentient, non-conscious forces and elements, and he therefore argues 
that the laws of nature display a high degree of uniformity over time and space. His 
philosophy of social science, by contrast, recognises that the social world is filled 
with conscious, intelligent, and relatively autonomous beings, and he concludes 
from this that the laws of society are less uniform and harder to identify (1977, vol. 
1, 159). Under capitalism, for instance, the productive activity of every individual 
modifies the economic system in a specific way. Because there are billions of people 
simultaneously producing things across the globe, ‘the sum-total of these changes 
in all their ramifications in the capitalist world economy could not be grasped even 
by seventy Marxes’ (1977, vol. 14, 325). Lenin therefore ‘rejects the very idea that 
the laws of economic life are one and the same for the past and the present’. He 
instead believes that ‘every historical period has its own laws’ (1977, vol. 1, 167). 
Lenin also argues that ‘earlier economists misunderstood the nature of economic 
laws when they likened them to the laws of physics and chemistry’. In his view, ‘a 
more thorough analysis shows that social organisms differ among themselves as fun-
damentally as plants or animals’. This high degree of variation in social phenomena 
makes truth claims in the social sciences more uncertain than the natural sciences 
(1977, vol. 1, 167).
Lenin argues that the historical sciences are particularly fallible, for whilst he 
views the development of history to be a law-governed process, the observed events 
rarely repeat themselves with the same consistency as natural phenomena. This 
means that ‘it is by no means precluded, but, on the contrary, presumed, that certain 
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periods of development may display peculiarities in either the form or the sequence 
of this development’ (1977, vol. 33, 477).
In Lenin’s view, another insurmountable obstacle to certain knowledge in the 
historical sciences is that the evidence on past social structures and events is often 
non-existent, inaccessible, or insufficient. This hinders the explanatory power of 
historical materialism, which requires empirical data in order to establish the base-
superstructure relation. ‘Lack of factual material made it impossible to apply this 
method to an analysis of certain very important phenomena in ancient European his-
tory—for instance, that of gentile organization’, which, as a result, ‘remained a rid-
dle’ (1977, vol. 1, 150).
Even when the historical data is available, Lenin argues that the historian can 
never assimilate it all, and this limits the validity and scope of their analysis. In his 
review of Bogdanov’s book, A Short Course of Economic Science, for instance, 
Lenin commends the considerable yet non-exhaustive range of references, before 
commenting that ‘It would be impossible to outline, in any course, no matter how 
extensive, all the data of modern science on all periods of economic development 
and on the history of economic views from Aristotle to Wagner’ (1977, vol. 4, 50).
Lenin argues that the epistemological problems of the historical sciences prohibit 
the attainment of non-revisable knowledge in this sphere. He therefore rejects ‘that 
most banal and vulgar accusation’, that ‘Marxists profess the immutability of an 
abstract historical scheme’. In his view, ‘no Marxist has ever regarded Marx’s the-
ory as some universally compulsory philosophical scheme of history’ (1977, vol. 1, 
192). Like Engels before him, Lenin opposes the socialist philosopher E. Duhring, 
who, ‘on the most complex questions of science in general, and of historical sci-
ence in particular… scattered words right and left: ultimate, final and eternal truth’. 
According to him, the only truths that can be established in the historical sciences 
are mundane facts and trivialities that cannot be utilised in the service of a dogmatic 
politics: ‘“Napoleon died on May 5, 1821,” says Engels…explaining to Duhring 
what one who claims to discover eternal truths in the historical sciences has to con-
fine himself to, what “platitudes” he has to be satisfied with’ (1977, vol. 14, 133, 
132).
Lenin believes that politics is the most fallible science, however, for it inherits all 
of the problems of the other social and natural sciences, whilst possessing unique 
problems of its own. In the first place, whereas scientists can accurately predict 
when natural events will occur, the same kinds of predictions are impossible in the 
more ‘difficult and complex science’ of revolutionary politics, where the complex-
ity of events precludes the possibility of accurate forecasting (1977, vol. 27, 198). 
Whilst Lenin argues that it is ‘natural for children to “understand” science to mean 
something that can determine in what year, spring, summer, autumn or winter’ capi-
talism will collapse, he believes that these are ‘ridiculous, vain attempts to ascertain 
what cannot be ascertained’ (1977, vol. 27, 327).
In the second place, whereas various natural phenomena manifest themselves 
through a predictable and regular sequence of events, Lenin believes that one will 
rarely observe the same degree of uniformity in politics. He argues that revolu-
tionary periods are particularly hard to discern and predict: ‘to say “a revolution 
has taken place in one country, so now it must take place in Germany”—is false 
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reasoning. There is a tendency to form an order of sequence, but this cannot be 
done’. One cannot know ‘whose turn it will be, when it will take place, and with 
what degree of success’ (1977, vol. 24, 267). In the preface to the second edition 
of The Development of Capitalism in Russia Lenin argues that societies are com-
plex organisms, and as such, ‘infinitely diverse combinations of elements of this 
or that type of capitalist evolution are possible’. He concludes that it is futile to 
try and predict with certainty which direction Russian society will take:
In a revolutionary epoch, life in a country proceeds with such speed and 
impetuosity that it is impossible to define the major results of economic 
evolution in the heat of political struggle…How this struggle will end, what 
the final result of the first onset of the Russian Revolution will be—it is at 
present impossible to say (1977, vol. 3, 34).
The political conclusions that Lenin draws from the unique epistemological prob-
lems of the social sciences highlights how far his theory of scientific socialism is 
opposed to the dogmatism and intellectual orthodoxy that it is commonly accused 
of generating. Nowhere are these conclusions clearer than in chapter six of Mate-
rialism and Empirio-Criticism. Here Lenin argues that ‘the whole attempt’ to 
establish political truths by appealing to truths in the natural sciences ‘is worth-
less from beginning to end’, for the laws of the natural sciences, when ‘applied to 
the sphere of the social sciences, are empty phrases’. This is because ‘an enquiry 
into social phenomena and an elucidation of the method of the social sciences 
cannot be undertaken with the aid of these concepts’. Whilst Lenin believes that 
‘nothing is easier than to tack an “energeticist” or “biologico-sociological” label 
on to such phenomena as crises, revolutions, the class struggle and so forth’, he 
argues that there is nothing ‘more sterile, more scholastic and lifeless than such 
an occupation’ (1977, vol. 14, 328).
Lenin’s purpose in stressing the fallibilism of the social sciences is to empha-
sise the importance of openness and tolerance in political debate. Whilst ‘history 
as a whole, and the history of revolutions in particular, is always richer in con-
tent, more varied, more multiform, more lively and ingenious than is imagined 
by even the best parties’, he believes that ‘In politics it is even harder to know 
in advance which methods of struggle will be applicable and to our advantage in 
certain future conditions’ (1977, vol. 31, 95–96). During revolutionary periods 
Lenin (1977, vol. 17, 42–43) argues that it is ‘natural and inevitable that there 
should emerge “a revaluation of all values”, a new study of fundamental prob-
lems, a new interest in theory, in elementals, in the ABC of politics’. When Rosa 
Luxemburg therefore accused him of permanently closing down the avenues of 
inner party debate, he replied that her criticism had no basis: ‘She puts in my 
mouth commonplaces, general principles and conceptions, absolute truths, and 
tries to pass over the relative truths, pertaining to perfectly definite facts, with 
which alone I operate’ (1977, vol. 7, 476). Lenin did not see the reduction of 
inner-party democracy as a universal principle, valid for all times and places, as 
Luxemburg seemed to think. He instead saw it as a temporary response to the 
autocratic circumstances of tsarist Russia, where inner-party democracy was 
infeasible (Mayer 1999, 45).
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It would be wrong to conclude that Lenin’s fallibilist conception of political sci-
ence rejects the maintenance of fundamental political principles in Marxism. On the 
contrary, a distinctive hallmark of Lenin’s writings is his militant defence of these 
principles against various forms of ‘revisionism’—a pejorative term that he popu-
larised. In his aptly titled article Our Programme, for instance, Lenin rejects Bern-
stein’s amendments to Marxism on the basis that they failed to advance ‘the science 
which Marx and Engels enjoined us to develop’. He immediately anticipates the 
‘flood of accusations’ that his anti-revisionism would (and still) bring: ‘The shouts 
will rise that we want to convert the socialist party into an order of “true believers” 
that persecutes “heretics” for deviations from “dogma,” for every independent opin-
ion’ (1977, vol. 4, 211). Lenin’s summary of these ‘trenchant phrases’, which are 
still repeated today, is that ‘there is not a grain of truth or sense in them’. His first 
line of defence is that a successful revolutionary movement requires a revolutionary 
theory. If all principles are open to question then the mass organisations will frac-
ture and dissipate into a multitude of insignificant groupings. Without a stable set 
of underlying assumptions it will be difficult for the various sections of the working 
population to unite into an effective force. Lenin’s second and more persuasive argu-
ment is that ‘to defend such a theory, which to the best of your knowledge you con-
sider to be true, against unfounded attacks and attempts to corrupt it is not to imply 
that you are an enemy of all criticism’. In other words, the protection of theoretical 
fundamentals is not incompatible with the freedom to criticise and debate political 
issues. He goes on to state that:
We do not regard Marx’s theory as some thing completed and inviolable; on 
the contrary, we are convinced that it has only laid the foundation stone of the 
science which socialists must develop in all directions if they wish to keep 
pace with life (1977, vol. 4, 211).
In conclusion, Lenin (1977, vol. 4, 212) argues that ‘an independent elaboration of 
Marx’s theory is especially essential’ for all socialists, for ‘this theory provides only 
general guiding principles’, which must be applied differently in accordance with 
the peculiar characteristics of each country. The notion that Marxism requires an 
‘independent elaboration’ is particularly anti-dogmatic, for individuals will inevita-
bly develop different policies.
Lenin puts forward a similar argument in his article Uncritical Criticism. Here 
he states that the commitment to fundamental principles should not mean a commit-
ment to dogmatism. ‘Let us not believe that orthodoxy means taking things on trust, 
that orthodoxy precludes critical application and further development, that it permits 
historical problems to be obscured by abstract schemes.’ In Lenin’s view, Marxists 
are not required to subscribe to any belief without reason, and they should not accept 
any formulation as so authoritative that it cannot be modified or rejected as the result 
of discussion. ‘If there are orthodox disciples who are guilty of these truly grievous 
sins’, says Lenin, then ‘the blame must rest entirely with those disciples and not by 
any means with orthodoxy, which is distinguished by diametrically opposite quali-
ties’. He goes on to say that ‘to accept anything on trust, to preclude critical applica-
tion and development, is a grievous sin; and in order to apply and develop, “simple 
interpretation” is obviously not enough’ (1977, vol. 3, 630). This belief underlies his 
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view that even ‘Engels was not infallible. Marx was not infallible’, for some of their 
ideas had been made antiquated by historical developments (1977, vol. 35, 269–272; 
vol. 20, 433). Lenin (1977, vol. 3, 33) warns against uncritically relying upon the 
classics for contemporary political solutions, for ‘only hopeless pedants could set 
about solving the peculiar and complex problems arising merely by quoting this or 
that opinion of Marx about a different historical epoch’.
Lenin directs his fiercest criticisms against the socialists who, in his view, ignored 
the necessity of critically applying and developing the fundamental principles of 
Marxism. In the first place, he chastises the ‘old Bolsheviks’, who ‘played so regret-
table a role in the history of our Party by reiterating formulas senselessly learned by 
rote instead of studying the specific features of the new and living reality’ (1977, 
vol. 24, 44).
Lenin also criticises the Left Communists- ‘the doctrinaires of the revolution’- 
for their refusal to recognise that political principles must change in accordance with 
the changing historical conditions of each particular country. He reminds the ‘infan-
tile’ leftists that ‘any truth, if “overdone” (as Dietzgen Senior put it), if exagger-
ated, or if carried beyond the limits of its actual applicability, can be reduced to an 
absurdity, and is even bound to become an absurdity under these conditions’ (1977, 
vol. 31, 62).
It is the orthodox Marxists of the Second International, however, who receive the 
brunt of Lenin’s criticism. For although they recognised the necessity of adopting 
flexible tactics in theory, they ‘proved to be so undialectical in practice, so incapable 
of taking into account the rapid change of forms and the rapid acquisition of new 
content by the old forms’. ‘The principal reason for their bankruptcy’, in Lenin’s 
view, was that they refused to acknowledge the tactical changes made necessary by 
historical development, and they therefore ‘continued to repeat simple and, at first 
glance, incontestable axioms that had been learned by rote, like: “three is more than 
two”’. As Lenin points out, however, ‘politics is more like algebra than arithmetic, 
and still more like higher than elementary mathematics’. Thus, whilst the socialist 
movement undertook a qualitative change, and whilst ‘a new symbol, the “minus” 
sign… appeared in front of all the figures’, the orthodox Marxists ‘stubbornly con-
tinued (and still continue) to persuade themselves and others that “minus three” is 
more than “minus two”’ (1977, vol. 31, 102).
Whilst Lenin’s criticisms of old Bolshevism, Left Communism, and Second 
International Marxism may not convince everyone, they are founded upon his con-
viction that Marxism is not a body of ready-made answers, but a scientific theory 
that should be used to inform an independent and subjective analysis of society. The 
materialist dialectic highlights the complex, unpredictable and non-linear character 
of historical development, and this means that Marxism must revise itself in accord-
ance with this development. The political principles of scientific socialism therefore 
need to be as temporary as the social phenomena it reflects:
Our doctrine—said Engels, referring to himself and his famous friend- is not 
a dogma, but a guide to action. This classical statement stresses with remark-
able force and expressiveness that aspect of Marxism which is very often lost 
sight of. And by losing sight of it, we turn Marxism into something one-sided, 
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distorted and lifeless; we deprive it of its life blood; we undermine its basic 
theoretical foundations-dialectics, the doctrine of historical development, all-
embracing and full of contradictions; we undermine its connection with the 
definite practical tasks of the epoch, which may change with every new turn 
of history…It is precisely because Marxism is not a lifeless dogma, not a com-
pleted, ready-made, immutable doctrine, but a living guide to action, that it 
was bound to reflect the astonishingly abrupt change in the conditions of social 
life (1977, vol. 17, 39–42).
Lenin believes that the Russian revolution itself provided ‘an instructive practical 
refutation of all doctrinarism’, for its development turned out to be ‘more original, 
more peculiar, (and) more variegated than anyone could have expected’ (1977, vol. 
31, 104; vol. 24, 44). As a direct consequence of this period, ‘the “revaluation of all 
values” in the various spheres of social life led to a “revision” of the most abstract 
and general philosophical fundamentals of Marxism’ (1977, vol. 17, 42–43). It was 
his political experience that encouraged Lenin to proudly proclaim, in the course of 
outlining The Three Sources and Three Component Parts of Marxism, that ‘the his-
tory of philosophy and the history of social science show with perfect clarity that 
there is nothing resembling “sectarianism” in Marxism, in the sense of its being a 
hidebound, petrified doctrine’.
Lenin thought that the construction of socialism in Russia highlighted the incom-
pleteness of Marxist political science more than anything else. Whilst there had 
been several bourgeois revolutions before, there had been no socialist revolutions, 
and this meant that there were few texts to refer to. The masses were making history, 
and mistakes were therefore unavoidable. Lenin often emphasised that ‘We do not 
claim to be infallible; many of our decrees are bad’, and on multiple occasions he 
acknowledged that the task of building communism would ‘inevitably entail a vast 
number of experiments, a vast number of steps, a vast number of alterations, a vast 
number of difficulties…because we have no experience of this’ (1977, vol. 27, 312, 
410–411). An analysis of these political experiments and the problems they involved 
would dominate Lenin’s writings until his death in 1924.
Conclusion
One of the great myths about Lenin is that his commitment to science entailed a 
commitment to dogmatism and theoretical orthodoxy. This claim has no textual or 
philosophical basis. Lenin’s defence of scientific socialism is founded upon a fal-
libilist conception of science that defends a spirit of toleration and open criticism 
in political debate. This fallibilism permeates the text that is often viewed to be the 
quintessential work of his dogmatism, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism.
Liebman contends that the Third International supported an atmosphere of free 
discussion and criticism that opposed ‘dogmatic rigidity’ under Lenin’s guidance: 
‘the use of sergeant-major methods was no more inherent in the Leninist Comintern 
than was monolithism’ (Liebman 1975, 395, 401–403). This article has argued that 
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this openness resulted from a commitment to a fallibilist account of social scientific 
enquiry. Whilst the Third International may have had its faults during this period, 
the appeal to Lenin’s ideas in order to inform political activity was not a source of 
dogmatism, but it’s opposite.7 According to O’Neill (1996, 63), the alleged closure 
of that debate and the development of a political and social scientific orthodoxy was 
a ‘later post-Leninist phenomenon’.
With the rise of the 24 hours news cycle, unbalanced news reporting, and social 
media, more political commentators now argue that Western societies are living in 
an era of ‘post-truth politics’, a political culture in which debates are dominated 
by appeals to human emotion and irrationality rather than facts and rational argu-
ment. The increasingly anti-scientific tone of this discourse—as seen, for instance, 
in the debates concerning the Brexit referendum and the 2016 U.S presidential elec-
tion—carries the danger of degenerating into forms of dogmatic assertion that are 
immune to rational debate. The intellectual virtues underlying Lenin’s philosophy of 
science—his anti-orthodoxy, his anti-dogmatism and his insistence on debates that 
meets the standards of rational enquiry, are now in as much need of being reclaimed 
as the core virtues of politics as they were when he first defended them.
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